Columbia
Missourian, August 15, 1993
In
1956, television’s most successful writer, Rod Serling, wrote a
teleplay for CBS’s United
States Steel Hour
based on the lynching of a 14-year-old black boy in Mississippi. The
network balked, forcing Serling to make changes. As he later said,
“the black [man] was changed to suggest ‘an unnamed foreigner,’
the locale was moved from the South to New England—I’m convinced
they would have gone to Alaska or the North Pole and used Eskimos
except that the costume problem was of sufficient severity not to
attempt it. But it became a lukewarm, emasculated, vitiated kind of a
show.”
The
paradox of Serling’s career rests on the fact that he was committed
to writing topical, controversial material, yet his talent was best
suited for television, the most censored and regulated mass medium.
As biographer Gordon Sander shows, Serling engaged in an ongoing
battle with network censors, earning him the label “television’s
last angry man.” Thus while Serling was winning six Emmy awards,
the president of his own network was determined to drive him off the
air.
Serling’s
stroke of genius, what allowed him a respite from
the censors, was his series The
Twilight Zone
(1959-1964). When he first announced his intention to do a fantasy
series, many accused him of selling out. But The
Twilight Zone
allowed Serling to tackle issues
like
nuclear war, racism, blacklisting and lynching in allegorical
fashion. As his wife, Carol, said, “Rod felt
that drama should be an assertion of social conscience. He found that
in The
Twilight Zone,
through parable and suggestion, he could make the same point that he
wanted to make with straight drama.”
Sander
traces Serling’s journey to The
Twilight Zone
in a way that highlights the major influences on his career. Except
for a cloying, pretentious introduction in
which,
in
New Journalism fashion, Sander reads himself into Serling’s
thoughts at a certain point in his career, the author presents
Serling’s life in a straightforward manner. He devotes chapters to
Serling’s childhood in Binghampton, New York, his service as a
paratrooper in World War II, his years at the liberal arts Antioch
College in Yellow Springs, Ohio, and his early career in radio and
television in Cincinnati, showing
how
these experiences shaped Serling’s art and world view.
In
an excellent chapter on television’s short-lived “Golden Age,”
Sander recreates the excitement surrounding the era when people were
beginning to grasp the medium’s possibilities. At the center of
this creativity were talented screenwriters such as Gore Vidal, Paddy
Chayefsky, Earl Hamner, and Reginald Rose. According to director
Arthur Penn, the principle for television’s success was to “get
the good writers, and the good writers will bring the good actors,
and the good actors will bring the good directors. And there we were,
that’s how we became a circle. Each one of us would stimulate the
other.”
Through
the early years
of television’s “Golden Age” Serling had built up a reputation
as a talented screenwriter, but a success on the scale of Chayefsky’s
1953 drama Marty
eluded him until 1955 when Kraft
Television Theater
presented his teleplay Patterns.
The script was about the psychological underside of the era’s
celebrated “man in the gray flannel suit.” Most effective was
what critic Andrew Sarris called the play’s “anti-cliché
ending to end all anti-cliché
endings,” in which the idealistic younger executive confronts the
company’s ruthless head. The boss refuses to atone for his
viciousness, offers the younger man a chance to stay, and the
honorable man accepts.
Patterns
catapulted Serling into prominence as television’s leading writer.
He followed it with other excellent plays, most notably Requiem
for a Heavyweight
for
Playhouse
90
in
1956. But while Serling was at the top of his profession, many of the
medium’s other leading writers
were leaving the business, incensed by sponsor interference with the
content of the shows. Advertisers wanted upbeat programs,
reasoning these would sell more products. By 1959, CBS was under the
dominion of network president James Aubrey whose business philosophy
was “The more interesting the programming content of a television
show is, the more it interferes with the commercial message.”
In
this atmosphere it is amazing that
CBS accepted
The
Twilight Zone.
The network brass probably were relieved Serling would be preoccupied
with his fantasy series. But the show remained topical. It was, for
instance, the first time television portrayed a nuclear war in the
1959 episode Time
Enough at Last.
As Carol Serling said, “The TV censors left him alone, either
because they didn’t understand what he was doing or believed that
he was truly in outer space.” But Serling earned the enmity of
Aubrey, who was determined to rid CBS of The
Twilight Zone.
After
the show’s cancellation in 1964, Serling never recaptured the form
that had made him the top in his profession. Sander traces his last
years until his death in 1975, where
Serling was reduced to shilling products
like
Anacin, Crest and Echo Floor Wax, as well as hosting such insipid
game shows as Rod
Serling’s Liar’s Club.
In a Twilight
Zone-style
twist, Serling seemed caught in one of his own plays, like Mountain
McClintock, the former boxing champion reduced to working as a
professional wrestler in Requiem
for a Heavyweight.
Or, as one character warns the successful television writer in
Serling’s 1959 play The
Velvet Alley,
“You know how they do it? They give you a thousand dollars a week,
and they keep giving it to you until you can’t live without it.
Then they start to talk about taking it away, and there isn’t
anything you won’t do to keep that thousand dollars a week.”
Serling
ranks in importance with such people as Edward R. Murrow, Lucille
Ball and Ernie Kovacs as a television pioneer. Sander provides a
useful introduction to Serling’s legacy, as well as the growth of
the medium that has revolutionized virtually every facet of American
life in the past 50 years.
Chance democratic
Saturday, November 12, 2016
Friday, November 11, 2016
Review, Nat Hentoff, Listen to the Stories: Nat Hentoff on Jazz and Country Music (HarperCollins, 1995)
Columbia
Missourian, September 17, 1995
The
great bebop saxophonist Charlie Parker liked to go into his favorite
tavern and play country music on the jukebox. Astounded by his taste
for what they considered a clearly inferior musical form, Parker’s
fellow jazz musicians asked him, “How can you stand that stuff?”
“The
stories, man,” Parker replied. “Listen to the stories!”
Nat
Hentoff has been listening to the stories for more than a half
century from his boyhood in Boston to his long tenure as jazz critic
for the Village Voice. His musical interests, though, extend
beyond even the elastic term “jazz”; this book collects many of
his writings over the past decade on folk and country music as well
as jazz.
But,
as Hentoff argues, such categories are arbitrary. The music
transcends artificial boundaries, with the great performers drawing
inspiration from a wide range of sources. Thus jazz pianist Fats
Waller used to warm up for his performances by playing Debussy.
Similarly, Parker not only enjoyed country, but also was a
knowledgeable fan of classical music. As he once said about listening
to Bartok’s “Second Piano Concerto,” “I heard things in it I
never heard before. You never know what’s going to happen when you
listen to music. All kinds of things can suddenly open up.”
Similarly, country singer Merle Haggard not only is a walking
encyclopedia of almost every style of country music, but also claims
as an influence the jazz of such performers as Belgian guitarist
Django Reinhardt.
This
multiculturalism often transcends racial lines, pointing up that much
of the best American culture is a mulatto hybrid. The King of Texas
Swing, Bob Wills, was heavily influenced by the songs of black
sharecroppers he heard as a youth in west Texas, and as a boy he once
traveled 50 miles by horseback to see a performance by the great
blues singer Bessie Smith. When Hentoff once commented to country
banjo player Earl Scruggs that he heard a strong Irish influence in
Scruggs’s playing, the musician responded, “A lot more than
Irish. There’s black in there, too. No musician with ears can leave
out the black.” As Dizzy Gillespie once said, “All of music is
out there in the first place, all of it. From the beginning of time
the music was there. All you have to do is try to get a little piece
of it. I don’t care how great you are, you only get a little piece
of it.”
Most
of the articles are short (two-three pages); Hentoff has developed a
knack for brief, memorable descriptions of a performer’s abilities.
About vocalist Carmen McRae, he comments, “You could hear the
commas in the lyrics,” while for trumpeter Buck Clayton, “In his
solos even the silences pulsated.” Other descriptions are less
kind: Dave Brubeck “played the piano as if he were clearing a
lifelong trail through a forest of giant sequoias,” while vocalist
Mary McHugh “sang with all the passion and dynamics of Justice
William Rehnquist.” Occasionally the opinions border on the
heretical, as when Hentoff defends Bing Crosby as one of the most
underrated jazz singers.
While
Hentoff celebrates the music’s heritage, he expresses concern for
its future. Ironically, much of the crisis in jazz has been brought
about by its success in infiltrating academia, with the establishment
of jazz programs at several major universities. This higher musical
education has imbued a generation of performers with phenomenal
technique and an encyclopedic knowledge of the form, but also often
makes listening to the music as exciting as reading a phone book.
Hentoff complains that an album by saxophonist Anthony Braxton, one
of the young lions of jazz, has liner notes, written by Braxton, that
are mainly mathematical equations. Often lost, Hentoff says, are the
indefinable ability to swing as well as the development of a personal
style. As multi-instrumentalist Benny Carter comments, “The kids
are fantastically endowed with technique. They do more today than I
would have thought possible fifty and sixty years ago. But they
sacrifice a lot of emotional content for technique. And skilled as
they are, I can’t tell one from another.”
Hentoff
also worries that children are not being introduced to the rich
musical legacy Americans have created. How many black students, he
wonders, “have the slightest idea that [Duke] Ellington was the
most abundantly original composer in the history of the country? And
a composer who in his work . . . wrote of the black experience in
America, from its beginnings, with extraordinary depth, wit,
tenderness, and strength. How many schoolkids of any color anywhere
in the United States know anything about Ellington? Or Lester Young?
Or Charles Mingus? Or Bessie Smith? Or Jo Jones? They have been
deprived of the richest, most distinctive strain of their own
cultural heritage. And most of them stay culturally deprived for the
rest of their lives.”
Tuesday, November 8, 2016
Review, Amy Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s (University of Chicago Press, 1993)
Columbia
Missourian, May 1, 1994
Swerdlow traces the history of WSP through the rest of the 1960s, showing how the organization played an important role in the movement against the Vietnam War. She also portrays the paradoxical relationship between WSP and the growing women’s movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The younger feminists frequently denounced WSP for accepting and even reinforcing traditional gender patterns. But as Swerdlow points out, the feminists failed to recognize how WSP had paved the way for their own success. For under the guise of defending stereotypical women’s roles, WSP had undermined the hegemony of those roles by building a women’s organization and challenging the traditional male bastion of politics. With a keen understanding of the complexities and ironies of historical change, Swerdlow argues that the story of WSP “reveals that maternal rhetoric can be an inspirational organizing tool, a source of energy, commitment, and passion. . . . It can mobilize a deeply felt woman’s critique, and project an alternative vision of international relations and social interaction, along with fresh forms of dissent and direct action.”
On November 1, 1961, in cities across the nation, 50,000 women marched under the slogan Women Strike for Peace to protest the American and Soviet governments’ testing of nuclear weapons. Defining themselves as mothers concerned for the welfare of their children, the demonstrators carried signs proclaiming “Save the Children.” Defending their unprecedented entrance onto the Cold War political stage in terms of their traditional maternal role, the women had little idea that they were changing the nature of American politics. But, as Amy Swerdlow argues, WSP itself was transformed as its members confronted the limitations of justifying their political participation on the basis of traditional gender roles.
For mothers in the post-World War II era, the culturally prescribed role was to remain home and provide a nurturing setting for the children of the baby boom and the working men in gray flannel suits. But many women felt increasingly stifled in suburban homes that Betty Friedan labeled “comfortable concentration camps.” Thus the opportunity to escape the home and participate in a meaningful way in a current political debate struck a responsive chord. By defending their politicization in terms of their maternal role, WSP members circumvented charges that they had no business in politics.
The spectacle of so many female demonstrators baffled both the media and public officials, Swerdlow says. “Because the marchers seemed to belong to no unifying organizations and because their language was so maternal and nonideological, their sudden appearance on the political stage seemed to be totally apolitical and spontaneous.”
But the image, largely self-cultivated, that a group of political naïfs conceived and executed WSP is deceiving, Swerdlow says. In fact, a group of Washington, D.C., homemakers, led by the children’s book illustrator Dagmar Wilson, had called the strike five weeks earlier. Like a significant number of other women in WSP, Wilson was a successful career woman, though in light of the period’s emphasis on home and family, she chose to present herself as a concerned mother and homemaker.
Angered by other peace organizations’ unwillingness to speak out on the dangers of nuclear testing, Wilson and other women issued a call for women across the country to take a day off from their usual routine to draw attention to the dangers confronting themselves and their children. Specifically, Wilson saw the importance of injecting women’s voices into the political discourse. “You know how men are,” she said. “They talk in abstractions and prestige and the technicalities of the bomb, almost as if this were all a game of chess. Well, it isn’t. There are times, it seems to me, when the only thing to do is let out a loud scream. . . . Just women raising a hue and cry against nuclear weapons for all of them to cut it out.”
Originally, WSP was conceived as a one-time event, but the success of the November 1 demonstration encouraged the women to maintain their organization. At the same time, though, they were resolved not to form another hierarchically-structured organization with power concentrated in the hands of a few at the top. WSP, then came to be marked by a “structurelessness” that emphasized participation and democracy. As Swerdlow says, this structure, which the WSPers self-deprecatingly referred to as “unorganization,” became one of the groups most important legacies for the later women’s movement.
In the anti-Communist atmosphere of the early 1960s, even a group defending its activism along traditional gender lines, could not escape public attack forever. In December 1962, several WSP leaders were called before the House UnAmerican Activities Committee to testify about alleged Communist domination of the group. Throughout the Cold War period, an appearance before the committee carried with it the threat of social, political, and economic reprisals if the witness did not cooperate fully. But the WSPers refused to be intimidated by the committee, packing the room with supporters and handing out bouquets. The witnesses, even when refusing to cooperate, presented themselves as unwilling to play by traditional political rules. When a congressman demanded of one witness, “Did you wear a colored paper daisy to identify yourself as a member of the Women Strike for Peace?” she replied, “It sounds like such a far cry from communism it is impossible not to be amused. I still invoke the Fifth Amendment.”
Swerdlow traces the history of WSP through the rest of the 1960s, showing how the organization played an important role in the movement against the Vietnam War. She also portrays the paradoxical relationship between WSP and the growing women’s movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The younger feminists frequently denounced WSP for accepting and even reinforcing traditional gender patterns. But as Swerdlow points out, the feminists failed to recognize how WSP had paved the way for their own success. For under the guise of defending stereotypical women’s roles, WSP had undermined the hegemony of those roles by building a women’s organization and challenging the traditional male bastion of politics. With a keen understanding of the complexities and ironies of historical change, Swerdlow argues that the story of WSP “reveals that maternal rhetoric can be an inspirational organizing tool, a source of energy, commitment, and passion. . . . It can mobilize a deeply felt woman’s critique, and project an alternative vision of international relations and social interaction, along with fresh forms of dissent and direct action.”
Review, David W. Levy, The Debate Over Vietnam (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1991)
The
Maryland Historian, Spring/Summer 1992
In
his memoir A Rumor of
War, Philip Caputo
comments that the U.S. Marine Corps trained for Vietnam by imitating
tactics used by the British during the Malayan uprising of the 1950s,
a conflict which bore only superficial resemblance to the one in
Vietnam. “So, as always sees to be the case in the service,”
Caputo wrote, “we were trained by the wrong war.” As David Levy,
a professor of history at the University of Oklahoma, argues,
American policymakers were similarly “trained by the wrong war.”
The United States entered Vietnam on the basis of an intellectual
consensus that had been worked out in the late 1930s to justify
American entry into World War II. But the consensus unraveled as the
differences between the two wars—both
moral and political—became apparent to increasing numbers of
Americans.
Proponents
of a more active American role in world affairs during the late 1930s
based their arguments on two major foundations. First, they said, the
United States possessed vital interests throughout the world that
were threatened by the policies of Germany and Japan. Second, the
internationalists contended, in the present struggle there could be
no question of which side represented good and which side evil. But,
as Levy says, in the minds of those advocating greater international
involvement, “the two propositions were almost inextricably joined,
combined so intimately, so unconsciously, that it was hard to see
that the blend was, in fact, composed of two ingredients.”
This
combination of arguments survived World War II to become the basis of
the Cold War ideological consensus, with the Soviet Union supplanting
the Axis Powers. Americans supported this consensus for a variety of
reasons, but, Levy says, throughout the 1950s no one questioned what
might happen if the two fundamental principles ever diverged. “The
debate over Vietnam,” according to Levy, “occurred when this
venerable blend of ideas seemed, to large numbers of Americans, to
divide into its component parts, the parts each drawing the nation
toward differing courses of action.”
For
advocates of the war, the two basic ideas of the consensus—that
U.S. national security was endangered and the enemy was immoral—were
tied together by the “demonic specter” of communism. The
perception of a threat to national security took several forms, but
was seen most significantly in the “domino theory,” the idea that
if one country in Southeast Asia fell to the Communists, the rest
would follow in rapid succession. It was further argued that the
United States needed to show the Communists the futility of
undertaking wars of national liberation, and that failure to do so
would result in other, similar insurgencies. But, Levy says, the
“mere use of the word [communism] was often thought sufficient, by
advocates of American participation, to excuse themselves from
embarking upon laborious elaborations of why the fight was
necessary.” For the war’s supporters, the lesson to be learned
from the debate of the 1930s was clear—the United States must not
engage in a policy of appeasement toward aggression as the Allies had
toward Hitler at the 1938 Munich conference.
Opponents
of U.S. policies in Vietnam argued on several
bases that the war did not meet the criteria outlined by the
consensus view. They claimed that national security would not be
adversely affected by American withdrawal. But most importantly, Levy
says, they attacked the war on a variety of moral fronts. First,
antiwar spokespeople said the war was not really a response to an
invasion of South Vietnam, but rather the United States was
interfering in a civil war to prop up an unpopular government. This
argument, Levy says, was the most vigorously contested of the entire
debate, because both sides saw that the war’s morality was based on
this question of whether the United States was responding to outside
aggression. Finally, opponents decried the nature of the war itself.
In Vietnam, Americans saw their country using its vast technological
superiority to devastate a country in the name of saving it. The
brutality of American policy in Vietnam numbed the moral
sensibilities of those who fought there and the people back home who
watched the war unfold on their television sets. If advocates of the
war viewed Munich as the appropriate analogy, opponents drew upon
another symbol from World War II—the Nuremberg trials for war
crimes.
The
debate over Vietnam came to include an extremely broad cross-section
of the American people. But, as Levy points out, this debate was
really a series of smaller debates taking place within the context of
a wide variety of particular subcommunities. Levy looks at how the
debate unfolded within several of these subcommunities. Within
the Republican party, for example, the debate was relatively muted as
the party managed to maintain a general consensus throughout the war.
But the war shattered the Democratic party as several prominent
Democratic senators and congressmen openly challenged the policies of
President Lyndon Johnson. Among the relatively small but extremely
influential subcommunity of public policy intellectuals, the issue of
the war shattered the ideological consensus
they had
shared throughout the 1950s, as an increasing number of intellectuals
grew outspokenly critical of the war while others moved rightward and
demanded the administration take a harder line in Vietnam. The debate
over the war also took place within most major religious
denominations. And among African Americans, the issue found
articulate spokespersons on both sides. Many blacks
felt a personal sense of loyalty to President Johnson for his civil
rights and antipoverty programs, while others, such as Martin Luther
King, Jr., condemned the war for diverting attention away from these
programs.
Levy’s
book is most valuable in outlining the parameters of the debate
within these various subcommunities. But by eschewing a chronological
approach in favor of a thematic one, he fails to make clear the
process by which the debate came to dominate American politics in the
late 1960s. The consensus which Levy describes so effectively
dominated the major social, political, educational and media
institutions in the early part of the decade that the antiwar
movement had to emerge from outside these institutions. It first grew
out of the New Left, a loose coalition of mainly
white college students,
strongly influenced by the Civil Rights movement, who emphasized such
vaguely-defined principles as anti-imperialism, “participatory
democracy,” “authenticity” and “personal politics.” For New
Leftists, Vietnam focused all these concepts on a single issue. The
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a major New Left group,
organized the first major antiwar demonstration in April 1965. Only
slowly did antiwar sentiment work its way into the major American
institutions and become “respectable.” But as the antiwar
movement became gradually domesticated, the New Left grew
increasingly isolated from the movement it had done so much to
create, as radical activists began using more revolutionary rhetoric
and tactics. Levy fails to explain this process of the growth of the
antiwar movement, the way in which it developed outside the political
mainstream, and how it was gradually integrated into it.
Friday, November 4, 2016
Review, Donna Akiba Sullivan Harper, Not So Simple: The ‘Simple’ Stories of Langston Hughes (University of Missouri Press, 1995)
Columbia
Missourian, November 19, 1995
“Few
people have enjoyed being Negro,” Arna Bontemps once commented, “as
much as Langston Hughes.” In his poetry, fiction, drama, criticism
and journalism, Hughes delighted in expressing the realities of
African-American consciousness and existence in a variety of voices,
from educated members of the black bourgeoisie to the working-class
residents of Harlem. With an excellent ear for the vernacular, and
integrating various popular sources (such as jazz and blues) into his
writing, Hughes captured the everyday rhythms and the diversity of
African-American life. “Being colored myself,” he once wrote, “I
find us terrible subjects for all kinds of writing, full of drama and
humor and power and entertainment and evil and love and all sorts of
things.”
Because
of his success as a poet, though, the virtues of Hughes’ other
writings often are overlooked. In this valuable study, Donna Akiba
Sullivan Harper provides an in-depth study of Hughes’ “Simple”
stories which he wrote from the early-1940s until the mid-1960s. The
story line was built on a common theme: Two men from different
economic backgrounds meet in the democratic environment of a bar,
where they discuss a variety of topics. In this setting, the
less-educated character offers opinions that are often humorous,
though his plain-spoken common sense frequently cuts through the fog
of the educated character’s intellectual rationalizing to get to
the heart of the matter. Thus Simple stands in a long American
tradition, from Finley Peter Dunne’s Mr. Dooley to Mike Royko’s
Slats Grobnik to Norm and Cliff on Cheers.
In
Hughes’ stories, an educated foil, base on Hughes himself, though
eventually given the name Ananias Boyd, regularly meets the
working-class character, originally referred to as his “simple-minded
friend” (later given the name Jesse B. Simple), in a Harlem bar. As
Sullivan writes, “The premise of the Simple stories appeals as the
primary step in the human quest for peace, understanding, and common
ground: two men from different educational and cultural backgrounds
meet on an equal plane, exchange ideas, develop a friendship, and
bridge the gap between them.” But, as Sullivan points out, despite
their many differences, Boyd and Simple share one crucial
characteristic: They “both are black in a racially unbalanced
society.” This shared racial consciousness provides common ground
for the two. In Boyd’s view, Simple’s opinions might occasionally
be ridiculous, but they cannot compare with the absurdity of Jim
Crow.
Much
of Sullivan’s focus is on reconstructing the sociopolitical context
in which Hughes wrote. She argues, for instance, that the origin of
the Simple stories cannot be understood apart from African-Americans’
ambivalent response to American participation in World War II.
“Simple began his dialogues during the years when African Americans
struggled with their own mixed feeling about the United States and
its hypocrisy regarding democracy.” Black Americans resented being
enlisted in a war against Hitler’s racism while the United States
maintained an official policy of racism in the military and defense
industries as well as in large portions of society in general. Civil
rights activists used the war as an opportunity to force concessions
from the government regarding integration and employment. As Sullivan
comments, “From this climate of acute race consciousness sprang
Simple.”
But
Hughes refused to portray his characters as simply victims of racism.
Rather, he understood that blacks responded to prejudice with a
complex mixture of anger, sorrow, humor, resignation, resistance and
withdrawal. As Sullivan shows, essential to Hughes’ nuanced
portrait of Simple was the fact that the series originated in the
black press, beginning as part of a weekly column he began writing
for the Chicago
Defender in 1942.
Within this context, Hughes did not need to explain his various
references to prominent black personalities and aspects of black
culture. He could take for granted that his audience would understand
his allusions. In the black press, Sullivan says, “Simple never
needed to defend his anger about the travesties of American ‘justice’
or to explain his excitement about Lena Horne and Nat King Cole.
Hughes knew that in the Defender
he was free to select topics and use language—including slang—that
he surely would not have chosen for a predominately white audience.”
As Sullivan discusses, the writing of the Simple stories became more
complicated when Hughes began collecting them into book form for a
wider audience.
Hughes
continued writing about Simple for more than two decades, eventually
creating a play, Simply
Heavenly, and being
syndicated in the mainstream New
York Post. But by the
mid-1960s, Hughes’ gentle satire seemed an anachronism and he
retired Simple in 1965. As he would comment two years later, “so
‘out of joint’ are the times, and currently so confusing is the
racial situation, that were Simple to attempt to express the opinions
of the average Harlem ‘man in the streets’ right now, he wouldn’t
be considered as amiable as he used to be, nor the dialogue as
balanced. I am afraid that tolerance is running downhill at a rapid
rate and the situation is a difficult one to kid. And irony, satire,
and humor are so easily taken amiss these days, both uptown and
down.”
Yet,
as Sullivan argues, Simple remains a universally recognized character
type, still popular in this changed racial climate. With her detailed
examination of the processes Hughes used to create and maintain his
genial barfly, Sullivan demonstrates how, in Hughes’ words, “a
fictional character can be ever so ethnic, ever so local and
regional, and still be universal in terms of humanity.”
Thursday, November 3, 2016
Review, Howard Zinn, Failure to Quit: Reflections of an Optimistic Historian (Common Courage Press, 1993)
Columbia
Missourian, September 5,
1993
During
the past forty
years, few people have combined the roles of scholar and activist as
effectively as Howard Zinn. As a professor at Spelman College—a
black women’s college in Atlanta—during the 1950s, Zinn worked
with his students in the struggle for civil rights, later writing a
history of the movement. As a professor at Boston University in the
1960s, he was a leading intellectual in the anti-war movement. More
recently, he was an outspoken critic of the Persian Gulf War.
Zinn
never has seen his roles as being in conflict, but rather as
reinforcing each other. Using as a guide George Orwell’s dictum,
“Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the
present controls the past,” Zinn has sought to open American
history to powerless groups as the fist step to empowerment. Most
notably in his myth-debunking A
People’s History of the United States (1980),
Zinn has sketched history from the bottom up, reinterpreting such
staples of American mythology as the European “discovery” of
America by viewing it from the perspective of the American Indians
(and thus transforming the “discovery” into an “invasion”).
Failure
to Quit, which
collects some of Zinn’s articles and lectures from the past 20
years, draws lessons from history for contemporary activists. “As
this century draws to a close,” he writes, “a century packed with
history, what leaps out from that history is its utter
unpredictability.” Although this uncertainty might be
disconcerting, it also can offer solace to activists battling against
great odds. Pointing to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise
of democracy movements in many Eastern European countries, Zinn says
the first lesson one might draw from the history of the twentieth
century is “that the struggle for justice should never be abandoned
because of the apparent overwhelming power of those who have the guns
and the money and who seem invincible in their determination to hold
on to it.”
A
second lesson to be drawn from this history of ambiguity, Zinn says,
is that no justification for war is adequate. “Massive violence,
whether in war or internal upheaval, cannot be justified by any end,
however noble,
because no outcome is sure. . . . If the ends, however desirable, are
uncertain, and the means are horrible and certain, those means must
not be employed.”
Repeatedly,
Zinn argues that the impetus for social change throughout American
history usually has come not from government, but from ordinary
people. The Bill of
Rights, for instance, has been enforced and expanded only because
common people have insisted on taking its words literally, while
government officials normally have felt little compunction about
violating the stated rights. “If it were left to the institutions
of government,” Zinn comments, “the Bill of Rights would be left
for dead. But someone breathed life into the Bill of Rights. Ordinary
people did it, by doing extraordinary things. The editors and
speakers who in spite of the Sedition Act of 1798 continued to
criticize the government. The black and white abolitionists who
defied the Fugitive Slave Law, defied the Supreme Court’s Dred
Scott decision, who insisted that black people were human beings, not
property, and broke into courtrooms and police stations to rescue
them, to prevent their return to slavery.”
Democracy,
in Zinn’s view, is not the result of Congressional debates, Supreme
Court decisions or presidential directives. Democracy originates with
grass-roots movements that force those in power into changing the
status quo. Pointing to the sit-ins in the early years of the civil
rights movement, Zinn argues that had the students stayed within the
law, no fundamental change would have occurred. Only by violating the
law on a mass scale could demonstrators marshal enough power—moral,
economic and political—to change the law. “Because what the
movement did,” Zinn says, “was to create a countervailing power
to the policeman with a club and a gun. That’s essentially what
movements do: They create countervailing powers to counter the power
which is much more important than what is written down in the
Constitution or the laws.”
An
understanding of history is essential, Zinn says, for Americans to
assess the actions and rationales of their government. The government
controls the present and future by controlling the images most
Americans form of the nation’s past. This notion of American
history is crucial, for instance, in justifying U.S. involvement in
war. As Zinn argues, “one of the elements that goes into this
process of persuasion is the starting point that the U.S. is a good
society. Since we’re a good society, our wars are good. If we’re
a good society, we’re going to do good things. We do good things at
home. We have a Bill of Rights and color television. There are lots
of good things you can say if you leave out enough.”
With a firm grasp of history, though, Americans can see through claims such as the one former President Bush made to justify war against Iraq. Bush sought to establish America’s claim to the moral high ground by arguing that the United States stood against aggression. But as Zinn says, “The record of the U.S. in dealing with naked aggression in the world . . . is so shocking, so abysmal, that nobody with any sense of history could possibly accept the argument that we were now sending troops into the Middle East because the U.S. government is morally outraged at the invasion of another country.” Pointing out that American history is filled with instances of military aggression, from the white settlers’ first encounter with Native Americans to the history of U.S. relations with Latin America and more recent acts of aggression committed by the United States and its allies during the Cold War period, Zinn effectively argues that official U.S. outrage against military aggression is applied only selectively.
Zinn
is one of the handful of scholars who write primarily not for other
academics, but for a wider audience. His conviction that history
offers necessary lessons for the present and enables people to see
through the official falsification that constitutes so much of our
current political culture should inspire teachers, students,
activists and others with a healthy sense of skepticism toward those
in power. If my own view of the uncertainty of history is, as my
students complain, more pessimistic than Zinn’s, I am nonetheless
glad Zinn is there with his optimistic vision. As he says, “The
future is not certain, but it is possible.”
Review, Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Blacks and Reds: Race and Class in Conflict, 1919-1980 (Michigan State University Press, 1995)
Columbia
Missourian, 1995, July 2,
1995
In
August 1950, William Patterson, a prominent African-American member
of the American Communist Party, testified before the House Committee
on Lobbying Activities, which ordered him to turn over all records
and membership lists of the Communist-front Civil Rights Congress.
Patterson not only refused, but began to castigate Representative
Henderson Lovelace Lanham on the evils of segregation in the
congressman’s home state of Georgia. Infuriated,
Lanham leaped from his seat and charged Patterson, calling him a
“black son-of-a-bitch,” only to be restrained by two policemen.
Lanham’s remarks were stricken from the record.
The
committee cited Patterson for contempt and a grand jury ordered him
to turn
over the CRC records. While the case dragged on for eight months,
eventually to end in a hung jury, a coalition of black church leaders
and newspaper editors campaigned in support of Patterson. For many
African-Americans, even those unsympathetic to communism, Patterson
stood as a heroic figure for his willingness to confront American
racism publicly.
The
courage of American Communists, both black and white, in attacking
Jim Crow policies placed
them at the forefront of the struggle for integration throughout the
1930s and 1940s. Because of the party’s commitment to civil rights,
an impressive array of black intellectuals, including Richard Wright,
Langston Hughes, Ralph Ellison, Harold Cruse and W.E.B. DuBois, were
at one time either members or closely aligned with the party.
But
as Earl Ofari Hutchinson argues, for the majority of African
Americans, Communist doctrine held little appeal because it denied
the racial basis of American society. According to Marxist theory,
black workers had the same fundamental interests as did the white
working class. Party leader William Z. Foster, for instance, could
dismiss the Ku Klux Klan as “a class instrument for the oppression
of the working class, of whatever race.”
“Foster’s
opinion was certainly news,” Hutchinson comments, “to the
thousands of blacks who felt the rope, torch and bullets of night
riders. The Klan was an instrument of racial terror aimed not just at
‘whatever race’ but at blacks. If he had been completely honest,
he would have admitted that lynch mobs were not just made up of
capitalists but workers, too.”
For
American Communists, though, when theory and reality were out of
sync, the solution was to follow the theory and ignore reality. Thus,
white Communist writer Mike Gold could criticize Hughes for not
writing about proper “Negro themes,” just as the party would
accuse Wright of “petty bourgeois nationalism” for writing about
the psychological impact of American racism.
Despite
this basic misunderstanding, the CP gained widespread sympathy among
some sectors of the African-American community for its willingness to
speak up on black issues. The party played a prominent role in
efforts to free the Scottsboro boys, nine black men accused of raping
two white women in Alabama in 1931; in agitating for anti-lynching
legislation; and in ending legal segregation. During the Depression,
in such places as Chicago and Harlem, the party led the fight against
tenant evictions.
Within
the party, several blacks rose to positions of influence. James Ford
was a star athlete at Fisk University and a decorated veteran of
World War I before joining the party and gaining prominence as a
speaker, eventually serving as the CP’s vice-presidential candidate
in 1932 and 1936. During one campaign stop in Durham, North Carolina,
the local American Legion threatened to attack Ford if he spoke.
Unintimidated, Ford mounted the rostrum wearing his Army ribbons and
discussed his experiences serving in a segregated unit in the war.
After the speech, a group of sympathetic white students from Duke
University surrounded Ford and safely escorted him to the train
station.
Hutchinson
relates the stories of several other African Americans who played
important roles in the CP. Patterson, for instance, was an attorney
with extensive experience in the labor movement. In the late 1940s,
he used his position as head of the party-backed CRC to present a
petition to the United Nations charging the U.S. government with
genocide against African Americans. The petition was based on
principles derived from the Nuremberg war-crimes trials, which
defined genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or part, a national, ethnic, or religious group.” Although
the white press and government officials dismissed the petition, it
gained at least limited support from some black leaders, including
Walter White, head of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, for raising the issue of American racism in an
international context and focusing world opinion on civil rights
abuses in the United States.
Hutchinson’s
book focuses primarily on the response of the black bourgeoisie,
especially civil rights leaders and newspaper publishers, toward the
CP, and occasionally one wishes for a clearer idea of how the black
rank-and-file viewed the issue. For instance, in his book Hammer
and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression
(1990), Robin Kelley states that blacks in Alabama used the party as
a vehicle for organizing while basing their militancy more on
African-American folk culture than on Communist doctrine. More
generally, though, Hutchinson is persuasive in arguing that while
black workers might have supported the CP on specific issues, their
fundamentally different understanding of the nature of American
racism precluded any large-scale success in attracting African
Americans to communism.
The
relationship between the CP and African Americans is a complex
mixture of cynicism and good intentions. Hutchinson subtly traces
that history with an appreciation for its nuances and paradoxes.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)