American History Through
Literature, 1870-1920,
Tom Quirk and Gary Scharnhorst, Editors in Chief (Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 2006)
“What’s the matter with Kansas?,” journalist William Allen
White asked in 1896, as he surveyed the political landscape of his
native state and wondered at the preponderance of politicians “who
can bellow about the crime of ’73, who hate prosperity, and who
think, because a man believes in national honor, he is a tool of Wall
Street.” The frenzy of the state’s ruling Populists had not been
slaked, in White’s view, by having created a climate hostile to
investment and become the laughingstock of the rest of the country;
“then, for fear some hint that the state had become respectable
might percolate through the civilized portions of the nation, we have
decided to send three or four harpies out lecturing, telling the
people that Kansas is raising hell and letting the corn go to weed.”
In his essay, widely-reprinted in the Republican press, White
dripped sarcasm as he sought to convey how his state had lost touch
with reality: “Whoop it up for the ragged trousers; put the lazy,
greasy fizzle, who can’t pay his debts on the altar, and bow down
and worship him. Let the state ideal be high. What we need is not
the respect of our fellow men, but the chance to get something for
nothing.”
The bewilderment of White and other Republicans notwithstanding,
Populism resonated among southern, Midwestern and western farmers
because it bespoke their situation and articulated their often
inchoate sense that America had betrayed its democratic principles.
As Seagraves, the small-town editor in Hamlin Garland’s 1890 story
“Among the Corn-Rows,” thinks after speaking with a Midwestern
farmer, “This working farmer had voiced the modern idea. It was an
absolute overturn of all the ideas of nobility and special privilege
born of the feudal past. . . . Seagraves felt that it was a wild,
grand upstirring of the modern democrat against the aristocrat,
against the idea of caste and the privilege of living on the labor of
others. This atom of humanity (how infinitesimal this drop in the
ocean of humanity!) was feeling the nameless longing of expanding
personality. He had declared rebellion against laws that were
survivals of hate and prejudice. He had exposed also the native
spring of the emigrant by uttering the feeling that it is better to
be an equal among peasants than a servant before nobles.”
Seagraves tells the farmer he would like to use his ideas in an
editorial, prompting the farmer to comment “My ideas! Why I didn’t
know I had any.”
The
Farmer Feeds Us All
In the post-Civil War era, farmers increasingly found themselves
victimized by the growing incursion of market forces into formerly
remote areas, ensnaring them in a web of national, and even
international, commercial relations. With the goal of contracting
currency, Congress had demonetized silver in 1873—an act Populists
would later decry as “the crime of ’73,” though it was little
noticed at the time—and moved the country onto the gold standard by
the end of the 1870s. For many farmers, the result was the cycle of
ever-increasing debt that was sharecropping, tenancy, peonage or the
crop-lien system, leaving them caught, as Garland termed it in the
title of another story, “under the lion’s paw.” In the South,
the lien system came to be viewed by farmers as a new form of slavery
as they were forced to sign over to the furnishing merchant first
their crop and eventually their land. “In fact,” the historian
C. Vann Woodward has concluded, the crop-lien system “came to be
more widespread than slavery had been, for it was no respecter of
race or class; and if it be judged objectively, by its economic
results alone, the new evil may have worked more permanent injury to
the South than the ancient evil.” Dominant economic and social
theories, with their emphasis on laissez faire capitalism and
Social Darwinism, offered no sympathy for debt-ridden farmers in the
same way they offered none for the growing number of unemployed
wandering the country in the many depression years of the
late-nineteenth century. As an editorial in the Lincoln, Nebraska,
Farmers’ Alliance described the situation, “The actual
state of society to-day is a state of war, active irreconcilable war
on every side, and in all things. . . . Competition is only another
name for war. It means slavery to millions—it means the sale of
virtue for bread—it means for thousands upon thousands starvation,
misery and death. After four thousand years of life is this the best
that we can achieve? If so, who cares how soon the end may come?”
Farmers frequently joined together in singing Knowles Shaw’s
1870s-era ballad “The Farmer Feeds Us All” with its chorus:
Then take him by the hand,
All ye people of the land,
Stand by him whatever troubles befall;
We may say whate’er we can,
Yet the farmer is the man,
Yes, the farmer is the man that feeds us all.
But
integration into larger market networks drove crop prices down while
increased reliance on monopolies like the railroads, over whose rates
they had no control, made it more difficult for the farmers to feed
their own families. In an era of spectacular economic growth, the
irony was not lost on farmers that their desperate straits existed in
the midst of economic abundance. In the words of Alabama populist
Milford Howard, “The granaries are bursting with wheat; the bins
are filled with corn; the stock-yards are overflowing with cattle,
hogs and sheep; the fields of the South have been white with
cotton—an abundance everywhere throughout the entire country. Of
it we can say, as was said of the Promised Land of Canaan, ‘It
flows with milk and honey.’ Notwithstanding all this, the people
are starving.”
Throughout
the 1870s and 1880s, farmers in all regions had responded to the
situation with the formation of a variety of cooperative
organizations, including the Granger and Northern Alliance movements
in the Midwest, the Agricultural Wheel in the South, and the Texas
Alliance in the Southwest. These cooperative organizations had been
crucial in the development of what Lawrence Goodwyn has termed the
“movement culture,” which allowed the farmers to understand the
commonality of their interests and the nature of those who opposed
them, whether furnishing merchants, land companies, banks, railroads,
or grain elevator companies. Out of this movement culture developed
the collective self-confidence necessary to allow the farmers, en
masse, to formulate an alternative to the dominant cultural
understanding of the American economy and their role in it.
Economists told the farmers they were responsible for their own
troubles, having overproduced the market and thus driven prices down.
But farmers found a different culprit in the monopolies and trusts
that wielded such extensive control over Gilded Age society.
“Between [the] plenty ripening on the boughs of our civilization
and the people hungering for it,” wrote Populist muckraker Henry
Demarest Lloyd in his 1894 classic, Wealth Against Commonwealth,
“step the . .. . syndicates, trusts, combinations, with the cry of
‘overproduction’—too much of everything. Holding back the
riches of the earth, sea and sky from their fellows who famish and
freeze in the dark, they declare to them that there is too much light
and warmth and food. They assert the right, for their private
profit, to regulate the consumption by the people of the necessaries
of life, and to control production, not by the needs of humanity, but
by the desires of a few for dividends.”
The
People’s Party
With
the failure of the attempts at economic self-help, farmers
increasingly realized that a turn to politics had become necessary,
and so in the early 1890s was born the People’s Party. In its
major statement of purpose, the 1892 Omaha Platform, the party called
for a flexible paper currency to be distributed through the
sub-treasury plan, a system of government-owned warehouses in which
farmers could store their crops while borrowing against them; the
public ownership of the railroad, telegraph, and telephone companies;
a graduated income tax; and the direct election of U.S. senators.
With precious few allies in the universities, the mainstream press,
and other traditional seats of cultural power, the populist movement
developed its own processes for spreading its message, including the
National Reform Press Association, with its hundreds of newspapers
spread across the nation. “For a fact,” Nebraska’s Platte
County Argus commented, “this ought to be a campaign of
education.” And the Populist leaders took seriously their role as
educators, as can be seen in the extensive use of statistics in the
writings of Kansas’s Populist Senator William Peffer; Lloyd’s
densely detailed descriptions of corporate malfeasance; the many
case studies discussed in 1892 presidential candidate James Weaver’s
campaign book A Call to Action; and the learned disquisitions
on such subjects as the Indian caste system and English labor history
that peppered the speeches of the South’s most famous Populist, Tom
Watson. Such raw material provided fodder for the extensive network
of stump speakers who campaigned across the country. The message
spread rapidly, as the Populists won elections in several southern,
Midwestern and western states, and their presidential ticket in 1892
gained more than one million popular and twenty-two electoral votes.
In
his dystopian novel Caesar’s Column (1890), Minnesota
populist Ignatius Donnelly described American republicanism as a
sham—“We are a Republic only in name; free only in forms.
Mohammedanism . . .. never knew, in its worst estate, a more complete
and abominable despotism than that under which we live. And as it
would be worse to starve to death in sight of the most delicious
viands than in the midst of a foodless desert, so the very
assertions, constantly dinned into our ears by the hireling
newspapers, that we are the freest people on earth, serve only to
make our slavery more bitter and unbearable.” Seeing themselves as
inheritors of the republican ideology of “producerism” dating
back to the American Revolution, Populists believed they were
completing the unfinished democratic project of the Civil War. As
Weaver said, “We shall proceed to show that in the very midst of
the struggle for the overthrow of the slave oligarchy, our
institutions were assailed by another foe mightier than the former,
equally cruel, wider in its field of operation, infinitely greater in
wealth, and immeasurably more difficult to control. It will be
readily understood that we allude to the sudden growth of corporate
power and its attendant consequences.”
The
growth of corporate power had come to dominate government, the courts
and the press, but its fundamental impact was even more pernicious in
that it ensconced greed as the dominating nexus of social relations.
As the Texas Populist intellectual Thomas Nugent described it, “The
spirit of plutocratic capitalism is the dominating force in our
organized social and industrial life. . . . It robs genius of its
glory, makes of intellect a drudge and a slave, and utilizes the
achievements of science to raid the stock markets and enlarge the
margin of profits. Thus it wipes out as with a sponge the
distinction between right and wrong, makes merchandise of the noblest
ideals, sets gain before the world as the highest end of life, and
converts men into predatory human animals.”
At
its base, the Populist argument rested on the labor theory of value,
that labor created wealth, which then became capital. But as capital
became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, it began to dominate
political channels, and the combination of concentrated capital and
state power served to impoverish the working classes, both rural and
industrial. In Nugent’s words, “Capital could never have
attained such ascendancy, but for the legislation which has given it
unjust advantages and enabled it to monopolize both natural resources
and public functions and utilities.” Or as Weaver claimed, “Labor
can create wealth but it cannot create money. It requires a statute
to speak money into existence. It is the creature of law, not the
product of nature.” In boiling the issue down to its most
fundamental level, Watson pondered, “What is the labor question?
In a nutshell it is this: Labor asks of capital, ‘Why is it you
have so much and do so little work, while I have so little and do so
much?”
The
Populists’ wide-ranging and penetrating critique of Gilded Age
capitalism rested, ironically, on a belief in the sanctity of
competition and private property. Populists sought some degree of
individual economic independence and private property was essential
in achieving it. In their view, as historian Norman Pollack has
stated, “property was only a threat when it became integrated with
mechanisms of domination” and thus worked contrary to the interests
of the community, and the Populist goal was to use the power of the
state to prevent the growth of monopolies where practicable and
assume ownership of natural monopolies in order to serve the public
interest. Existing monopolies thwarted genuine competition and the
philosophy of laissez faire left only the brutal competition
among surplus laborers that drove wages downward and among farmers
working to pay off their debts in a deflated economy.
Self-consciously
standing against the dominant ideology, Populists challenged such
justifications of excessive wealth and poverty as Social Darwinism,
arguing instead that government had a responsibility to protect the
weak. In the words of Lorenzo D. Lewelling, Kansas’s Populist
governor, “The survival of the fittest is the government of brutes
and reptiles, and such philosophy must give place to a government
which recognizes human brotherhood. It is the province of government
to protect the weak, but the government to-day is resolved into a
struggle of the masses with the classes for supremacy and bread,
until business, home and personal integrity are trembling in the face
of possible want in the family. . . .. If it be true that the poor
have no right to the property of the rich let it also be declared
that the rich have no right to the property of the poor.”
Populists also delighted in subverting the dominant discourse and
using the language of the business classes for their own ends. In an
age when the specter of anarchism haunted capitalists, the Decatur,
Texas, Times argued the monopolists were the true anarchists:
“Red-handed anarchy is fast developing in the soldiery of our
beloved Republic, in the courts, the elections, in the legislatures
and congress.” Similarly Henry Demarest Lloyd could use the
language of self-interest and Social Darwinism for Populist ends,
arguing “the whole problem can be argued out from the point of view
of self-interest, putting the self-interest of the community against
the self-interest of the individual; the self-interest of the better
against the self-interest of the worse; and reading the survival of
the strongest to mean the survival of the stronger virtues, not the
stronger greed.”
Populists
saw their movement as very much in the American grain and presented
themselves as the true defenders of the Constitution and the law. In
their view, the corporate hijacking of the courts and law-making
bodies represented a betrayal of the American constitutional system.
This commitment to established constitutional means also set the
parameters of acceptable Populist activity, largely defined by party
organizing and participation in elections, and a rejection of
violence as a political tool. As Nugent cautioned, “in combatting
monopoly, let us never forget that neither force nor infringement of
individual liberty is justifiable or safe. Let us remember that we
ought above all others to set ourselves against anarchy in every
form, against every measure calculated to break down the security
which the laws afford to private property, and in favor only of those
lawful and orderly methods which can always be successfully defended,
and the observance of which will never fail to enlist for the
workingman the sympathies of the good and worthy people of every
class. .. . . A good cause committed to violent methods inevitably
finds in them its grave. An intelligent ballot is the only refuge of
justice and liberty.” Similarly Donnelly’s cautionary tale,
Caesar’s Column, warned of a coming apocalypse when the
workers turned to violence, culminating in “a hell of injustice,
ending in a holocaust of slaughter.”
Breaking
Down Barriers
A
special project of the Populists’ efforts to build a mass movement
was the attempt to form alliances that bridged several of the deepest
rifts in Gilded Age America. From their agrarian origins, farmers
reached out to industrial workers and the unemployed, fellow victims,
in their view, of the war between the classes and the masses. The
Omaha Platform championed the cause of industrial labor with its call
for the limitation on immigration to reduce competition for jobs,
enforcement of the eight-hour workday, the abolition of the
strikebreaking Pinkerton Agency, and support for the Knights of
Labor. The party stood with labor in all the era’s major
conflicts. In the 1892 strike against Andrew Carnegie’s Homestead
Steel Plant, Mary E. Lease, one of Populism’s most famous stump
speakers, specifically called on Kansas farmers to send the striking
workers a trainload of supplies: “We have been told by those who
deal in misrepresentations that the farmers were not in sympathy with
the wants and demands of laborers in town and city. Let us hurl this
falsehood back, and show to the world that the farmers of Kansas are
imbued with the spirit of 1776, and in sympathy with the toilers and
oppressed humanity everywhere.” In his book A Strike of
Millionaires Against Miners (1890), Henry Demarest Lloyd
described miners caught in a circle of debt similar to the crop-lien
system. “Sometimes it was one thing, sometimes another; but the
upshot of it was that, mostly, when the miner came to settle with the
company for the preceding month’s work, he found that, after paying
for his oil, and the sharpening of his tools, his rent or his monthly
installment on the lot he had bought, his monthly contribution to the
doctor, and his bill at the company’s store, there was nothing
left. He had just made ends meet; perhaps he was a little behind.”
Similarly
the Populists supported the cause of the unemployed. In their
critique of industrial capitalism, Populists like Lewelling viewed
the growing number of unemployed as a direct product of the
combination of monopoly and increasing mechanization. “In this
country, the monopoly of labor-saving machinery and its devotion to
selfish instead of social use, have rendered more and more human
beings superfluous until we have a standing army of the unemployed
numbering even in the most prosperous times not less than one million
able-bodied men.” In his 1891 novel Congressman Swanson,
Charles C. Post described the business classes’ response to the
growing number of unemployed: “And as the machinery of legislation
was in their hands, or the hands of their dupes and tools, the
politicians, ‘Tramp laws’ were passed, and it became a crime for
a man out of employment and out of money to ask for bread.”
Standing as staunch supporters of demonstrations of the unemployed
like that led by Jacob Coxey in 1894, the Populists called for the
federal government to create a program of public works to provide
jobs for the unemployed.
Finally,
in trying to build a national movement, the Populists found
themselves confronting the sectionalism and the regional hold the two
main political parties had on American politics. In an era in which
the bloody shirt was waved regularly, the Populists called on farmers
and workers to break with their traditional political loyalties and
support a third party. And in the South especially, this split
involved even more basic social issues, as existing party politics
intermingled at a fundamental level with the region’s racial
divisions. Populists in the South, then, in challenging the dominant
Democratic Party, confronted directly that party’s ideology of
white supremacy. Not all Populists were willing to make this break
with the past, but many southern Populists proved ready to stand in
economic and political solidarity across racial lines. Speaking of
black and white farmers, Watson said, “Now the People’s Party
says to these two men, ‘You are kept apart that you may be
separately fleeced of your earnings. You are made to hate each other
because upon that hatred is rested the keystone of the arch of
financial despotism which enslaves you both. You are deceived and
blinded that you may not see how this race antagonism perpetuates a
monetary system which beggars both.’ ” Similarly, the Louisiana
People’s Party adopted a resolution proclaiming, “We declare
emphatically that the interests of the white and colored races in the
South are identical. . . . Legislation beneficial to the white man
must, at the same time, be beneficial to the colored man.” Black
Populists too, realized that joining the movement involved a
wrenching break with traditional loyalties; as a black Georgia farmer
wrote, “It seems to be a hard thing for us colored men to give up
the republican party [sic], but let us stop and consider: We are
living in another man’s house, working another man’s land, and
our smoke house and meal-tub are in town. Let us quit the old party
and vote for wife and children and a chance for a home.” And yet,
as white southern Populists stressed, this willingness to break with
the region’s racial heritage and withstand the Democrats’
fearmongering cries of “Negro Rule” had its limits. As one white
Alabama Populist wrote, “This has nothing whatever to do with
social equality. It is a question of the material interests of both
races.”
Fusion
By allowing itself to be contained largely within existing political
processes, Pollack has said, Populism’s “protest was largely, if
not exclusively, confined to the channels that the society had
established to neutralize dissent.” These self-imposed ideological
parameters created a profound dilemma for the party in 1896 when the
question of fusion with the Democrats seemed to offer the best chance
for electoral victory. As historian Robert McMath commented, “Here
the logic and history of Populism as a movement collided with
the ultimate political question: how to get more votes than
the other guy.” Within the Democratic Party, the “free silver
faction” emerged in the mid-1890s calling for the free and
unlimited coinage of silver. Fueled by such popular works as W.H.
Harvey’s Coin’s Financial School (1894), bimetallists
called for a policy of inflation that, in the Populist view, still
left the fundamental issues unresolved; it did nothing to counter the
trend toward monopoly, nor did it create a flexible monetary system
that could keep up with population or industrial growth. When the
free silver faction took control of the Democratic Party and
nominated William Jennings Bryan, Populists faced the choice of
fusion with the Democrats, and thus jettisoning most of their
platform, or running their own candidate and guaranteeing the
election of the gold standard Republican William McKinley. Led by
such fusionists as Watson and Weaver, the party chose to ally with
the Democrats, though many Populists never accepted the decision. As
an outraged Donnelly said, “The Democracy raped our convention
while our leaders held the struggling victim.” Having channeled
its militancy into electoral politics, defeat in 1896 proved
devastating, and the Populist Party never recovered. In Pollack’s
words, “Populism did not decline gradually. It fell over a
precipice, to some extent a situation of its own making.”
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Lawrence. The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian
Revolt in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Kazin,
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McMath,
Robert C. American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898. New
York: Hill and Wang, 1992.
Pollack,
Norman. The Just Polity: Populism, Law, and Human Welfare.
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